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as increasing temperatures, precipitation, wind and storm activity and more extreme weather in all parts of the country are likely.
Other resulting changes such as a higher probability of landslide Climate change has largely been framed as large-scale problems demanding large-scale solutions (Hulme 2009 ). This perspective has also dominated science and knowledge production related to climate change adaptation where the focus typically has been on downscaling global climate models to more fine-grained models.
The way that scientific climate change knowledge to a large degree is filtered through climate models may be seen as a simplification that has aided the process of establishing climate adaptation as an issue. This has led both decision makers and scholars in the rapidly growing literature on climate adaptation to discuss the relevance of climate predictions, but also their limitations (Dessai et al 2009 , Adger et. al. 2009 ). As claimed by these authors, solving the challenge of presenting relevant knowledge is not only about providing more scientific knowledge (McNie 2007, Tribbia and Moser 2008) or more reliable predictions about future climate conditions (Adger et. al. 2009 , Dessai et al 2009 . On the contrary, we know from previous studies on related topics that there is no simple connection between access to more scientific knowledge and better policy decisions (Jasanoff and Martello 2004 , Miller and Edwards 2001 , Sarewitz and Pielke 2007 , Vogel et al 2007 .
There may be many reasons for more scientific knowledge not leading to better policies: The fact that the science provided is not relevant to the user needs, that the knowledge is not appropriate for the decision context and that the information is not sufficiently reliable or is poorly communicated (Sarewitz and Pielke 2007) . Climate science, relying heavily on global climate models, has proven quite difficult to translate for many practical purposes (see for instance Adger et. al. 2009; McNie 2007; Naess, Solli & Sørensen 2011 , Naess & Solli 2013 Ryghaug & Sørensen 2008; Ryghaug & Skjølsvold 2010; Ryghaug and Solli 2012; Tøsse 2012) . Consequently, it is central to ask what type of knowledge other than scientific information (based on downscaling of global climate models) might contribute to decision-making in a way that makes climate adaptation robust.
Adaptation to climate change is a relatively new research domain, where definitions, objectives and methods for adaptation are to a little degree settled in the research literature (Leith 2011) . However, one principle that is widely agreed upon is the understanding that adaptation will always be context-dependent (Nelson et al. 2007 ).
In this paper we argue that climate change has to be understood locally and that it is important to explore how climate change knowledge can be generated and made use of in local settings.
When observers claim that the threat of climate change produces a new set of problems for policy making, they usually also point to the need to develop new kinds of expertise and knowledge related to dealing with consequences of climate change (Giddens 2009 ).
This may for instance involve local practices of managing risks in relation to weather related events, such as avalanches. Thus, in this paper we shift away from the large-scale oriented perspective that has been dominating knowledge production in relation to climate change science by rather focusing on local adaptation practises and the relationship between different types of knowledge activated in the practice of dealing with the effects of climate changes.
To be more specific, we are studying a group of professionals that in their day-to-day business as snow clearers (they actually called themselves snowmen) are responsible for assessing and managing risks related to avalanches. How is their knowledge activated in relation to other types of local adaptation practices?
Assemblages of climate knowledge
In this article we ask how professionals or practitioners involved in climate change adaptation activities handle rather unclear situations when dealing with how to cope with the risks of avalanches.
Looking at how situations of impending avalanches are handled involves study of practical knowledge. However, quite often professionals characterize practical knowledge as 'tacit' and therefore difficult to make explicit and into something that can be shared, abstracted and moved (Schön 1983) . Also, practical knowledge is
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Assembling climate knowledge 20 often constructed from problematic situations that are confusing, disturbing and uncertain (Schön 1983) . The coming together of these traits -silent knowledge and an uncertain situation -may of course challenge the task of providing knowledge that enables societies to adapt to a changed climate. Our point of departure is developed from two questions: if practical knowledge is something that is assembled from different sources, will not such a construction process involve making tacit knowledge explicit? And inspired by Bruno Latour's account of deploying controversies (Latour 2005 ) as a means to understand how knowledge is produced, we may ask if the uncertainty of how to manage consequences of a changed climate may serve as an occasion where routine and practical knowledge becomes salient and relevant?
In addressing the first question we emphasize that knowledge and different meanings connected to knowledge are negotiated through participation and reification. Lave and Wenger (1991) have defined this as the process of giving shape to the experience of participating through producing objects that freezes these experiences. This includes all abstractions, tools, symbols, stories and concepts that freeze practices in a "rigid" form, which is the subject of new negotiations. This means we are interested in how local practitioners make their knowledge explicit and into something that can be abstracted, shared and moved, as well as how their local knowledge systems overlap and possibly also conflict with other assemblages of climate adaptation knowledge.
To investigate assemblages means to describe the hybrid associations of heterogeneous actors, humans and non-human (Latour 2005; Law 2004 ). This understanding of assemblage refers not to a depiction of the relation between different elements in a network. Rather we want to stress the point that the process of assembling shapes actors and actors' relations as well as their practices and understandings. In line with this thinking, John Law defines assemblages as a process of bundling 'in which the elements put together are not fixed in shape, do not belong to a larger pre-given list but are constructed at least in part as they are entangled together' (p. 42) hereby underlining the process of making assemblages, as well as the often ad hoc quality of assemblages. Exploring assemblages also includes considering how knowledge objects and tools (be they nature objects, rules of thumb or bureaucratic forms or schemes) contribute to stabilizing an assemblage. Leaning on this kind of understanding also implies that we will be interested in processes of destabilization when analyzing assemblages of climate adaptation knowledge. Thus, by describing climate adaptation efforts as assemblages, we believe this will give us some means to better understand the character and connectivity of practical knowledge in handling practical problems related to climate change adaptation and risks.
Investigating local and practical expertise
In this paper a particular focus will be on ways of dealing with av- The snow clearers also guided us into two high-risk avalanche areas. During our field trip, they pointed out evidential traces in the landscape of past avalanches and places where the most frequent events had happened. They singled out the placements, functions and malfunctions of braking mounds in the hillsides.
They also referred to special objects, often large rocks, that they used as snow benchmarks, and explained how knowledge objects informed risk assessments and their decision to close a road or not. These observations gave us valuable insights into how this group of actors developed their expertise and made use of their local expert knowledge in order to make sense of different weather phenomena. We were also made aware of how they interacted with different policy measures and other bodies of expertise.
Each of the guided tours lasted one hour. As we were guided around by the snow clearers, we engaged in a conversation that in practice became a continuation of the interview that had taken place. Our questions in the conversation emerged in a more improvised way and were mostly short questions like "what is this?" and "what happened here?" to encourage the informants to describe and to tell. We took notes from the tours that became useful in analyses. We also recorded fragments of the conversations as we moved along the tour, but these were not transcribed, partly due to poor sound quality.
Collaborative guesswork
Meeting up with two snow clearers at their home place in Breivikseidet in the district of Tromsø in northern part of Norway (almost 70 degrees North and above the Polar Circle), one of them presented himself as a third generation snow clearer. When asked about their understanding of climate changes and whether they had experienced any effects of climate change, they answered affirmatively: They had experienced changes in the weather conditions that affected their work practices. Indeed, they had observed changes in weather that they interpreted as signs that the climate was already changing. For instance, they claimed to have observed greater instability and rapid shifts in the weather conditions due to warmer winter periods. As one of them explained; "It can be four seasons in one day and it wasn't like that before". They also observed that the forest belt had moved higher up in the mountain hills. As a result the new vegetation helped bind the snow, a development they partly saw as an effect of increased average temperatures during winter.
They believed that as a consequence of climate changes avalanches behaved somewhat differently than before. These days, avalanches Daily, during winter he pays attention to the lower parts of the mountains, looks at the conditions and contacts us when those marks disappear, which are well-known to him. He uses some rocks as marks when assessing the amounts of snow.
When the rocks disappear, when it is smooth up there, then danger is impending, then it is 'overhanging danger' as he puts it (laughs). When he says this, he is often right. The most recent example […] he called us in the evening and told us to close the road because the last of his marks had gone. The road was closed, and the avalanche went the morning after.
He is certain about this. He is reliable, but these are marks and signs we have learned to look for ourselves in addition to the weather and the wind direction.
The knowledge practice involved a process of making sense of experience-based and often inherited knowledge in relation to interpretations of historic, present and predicted weather data and events.
Snow clearers seemed to posit this kind of knowledge themselves, but did also contact or were contacted by other local people with a particular strong knowledge about and interest in the hour by hour development of amounts of snow and wind direction in the 22 mountain landscape. When asked about why he was on the list of local area experts, one of the snow clearers responded: "Well, I'm a third generation snow clearer, so it is old experience, that's why. But, we do also consult others, elderly people, with knowledge about the area, when we assess the danger for avalanche."
When asked to elaborate on the interaction with other actors in the process of assessing risks of avalanches, another snow clearer said:
The cooperation was intended to go like this: the evaluations of the main contractors were made in cooperation with area experts and NGI, and the Meteorological Institute were supposed to give the weather prognoses. I don't think it works quite like that. In practise, we look at the weather forecast ourselves and make a complete evaluation before we contact the main contractor, or the main contractor calls and asks about the situation. During snowfall they may call us many times a day and want to know if there is danger of avalanches now or if there isn't.
Thus, the process of assembling knowledge was not so much a dialogue with the main contractor as intended by NPRA. In practice, it was more an ongoing dialogue between local area experts and geological expertise, both in the district office of the NPRA and in the Norwegian Geotechnical Institute. As one snow clearer reported, "During snowfall, the NGI call us, and then we will make judgements together based on the conditions of the past days." Local knowledge of weather and events seemed to be the central point in deciding how to deal with the avalanche threat. The overall process unfolds as a complex assembly of knowledge stemming from interpretations of signs in the landscape with a dynamic temporality and collaborative dimension to the knowledge production. The knowledge assemblage could be illustrated as such ( The process of assembling knowledge may be described as guess- After this accident, avalanche experts at NGI did mapping work in cooperation with the local area experts, like the snow clearers.
Although the rule was introduced by NPRA, it is only partially down-stream in the sense that the rule was constructed regionally by NPRA on the basis of the knowledge from local mapping work.
However, if NPRA in practice applied the rule without consulting with local knowledge, it could delegitimize it. The rule recommended that if there is a snowfall of more than 30 cm, then the road owner had to close the road. The snow clearers saw this as a quite sensible quantification, although they emphasized that in practice, one could not however rely on a scheme that should be obeyed regardless of the circumstances:
When the 30 cm [rule] came it was to be followed in any case.
And when the first snowfall came 4-5 years ago it snowed 40 cm. Then the message came: The road is to be closed! (laughs)
And this was the first snow in the mountain. This has been ridiculed. We were not involved in the assessment on this then, were just told to close the road. It seemed a bit silly.
According to the snow clearers we interviewed the whole weather situation, including the weather conditions days prior to a snowfall, also had to be taken into consideration when making these kinds of judgements. In situations like the one described above Assembling climate knowledge
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The snow clearers ridiculed the shape and function of the rock wall construction, pointing out that the wall in fact had no depot behind it, something they saw as necessarily to catch the enormous amounts of snow coming down. They had envisioned the worst case outcome resulting from this malconstruction being that the snow would tear the braking mound apart and bring the big rocks down on the line of cars waiting for the ferry. According to the snow clearers the braking mound was "only a symbol of safety." The construction of this symbol of safety placed right in the middle of their area of local expertise was perceived as a provocation evidenced by the nickname they had given to it -the "mocking mound." So the braking mound, not only served as a symbol of safety, but also was seen as a materialization of mockery. This materialization of mockery acted both ways -as a thing that the snow clearers as local area experts ridiculed, but at the same time it functioned also as a physical reminder that their local indigenous knowledge was not appreciated and taken into consideration to the extent they expected. As it turned out, their local knowledge had not been solicited when the mound was planned and built. Consequently, their confidence that climate adaptation measures would be designed in interaction with local expertise was relatively low.
Knowledge and learning in preparing society for emergency This became evident when reporting on an avalanche in the winter of 2007. In this case they were told that this was not an avalanche area. However, according to the snow clearer;
'Yes, it is,' I said, 'many avalanches have happened there.' But, then they asked us; 'Why haven't you told us before, why hasn't it been registered?' It has in fact been reported on many times before, but I have a suspicion that they take it more seriously when you cut off an entire community. A focus on increased preparedness represents a central part of the road authorities' way to respond to climate adaptation. However, according to the snow clearers interviewed here, there had been no answers from the manager in the municipality regarding how one could be able to reach the local community in case of an emergency, or how to bring people out of an isolated community and into safety if a large avalanche were to hit the road. One of the snow clearers said that he had asked for an emergency plan and had even made an offer to the municipality that they themselves could cut down the trees in the area so that they could have an emergency route that could work for caterpillars if they were isolated by avalanches, if they got paid to do it. As they claimed, "We have offered simple solutions, but have not succeeded in getting response from the municipality. We don't feel that our work is valued." The last remark effectively sums up their view of their role in the work of dealing with the consequences of climate change.
Further, the lack of an emergency plan lead them to question the will of the wider society, in particular the municipality administration, to actively implement a policy for dealing with risks related to avalanches.
Shaping adaptation policy sideways?
Climate science has been criticised for only to a small extent being able to offer useful knowledge for decision makers (McNie 2007; Naess, Solli & Sørensen 2011 , Naess & Solli 2013 Ryghaug and Solli 2012; Tribbia and Moser 2008; Tøsse 2013 Our general argument in this article is that tracing assemblages of knowledge envisioned a rather broad range of ways of knowing.
However, describing this knowledge is not straightforward. For example, the term "indigenous-like" knowledge has long been associated with the terms 'local knowledge' or 'ethnoscience,' indicating knowledge systems that are specific to cultures or groups in particular historical or social contexts (Richards et al. 1989 ).
Adding 'indigenous' to the terms 'knowledge' and 'science', then, signalled the embeddedness of indigenous truths, in contrast to the context-free 'truth' of science. As noted by Philip (2001) , the distinct meanings and uses of the terms 'indigenous knowledge'
and 'science' both depended on "a dichotomy separating universal, value-free, static truth from situated, value-laden, changing cultural beliefs (Philip 2001: 7292) . This dichotomy has been radically challenged by anthropology and STS, which suggests that all knowledge, including scientific knowledge, is specific to its particular cultural context. All knowledge, then, might be considered "local". The distinction between indigenous and scientific knowledge continues, however, to play a role in analysis of knowledge practices. For example, Wynne (2007) plan. This externalization demonstrates one major constraint related to the room for local action (in terms of materiality, regulations, policy and economy) as these factors are crucial in defining whether knowledge is relevant or not (Sørensen et al 2000) . What is thoroughly documented in our analysis is exactly the fact that it is the local experts that are performing the day-to-day climate politics of avalanche protection in this locality. Further, our analysis lends support to the suspicion that constraints of this sort are active through widespread expectations that more accurate and relevant scientific knowledge is to be moved in one direction from climate science through the traditional knowledge and policy institutions and their traditional intermediaries. Although we at this point see few examples of local collaborative knowledge activities and practices integrated into formal policy processes, we do see that there is a potential of integrating this kind of knowledge in decision-making processes. Drawing upon the lessons learned from this case study may provide insights applicable to other decision-making contexts where environmental knowledge should be appropriated. Thus, a call for better translations from the supply side of scientific knowledge to the demand side must acknowledge that the grey areas represented by local, sometimes indigenous-like, knowledge brokers also should be included as being part of the supply side, and that they in practice contribute to shaping policies sideways and hopefully creating more socially robust climate adaptation policies.
